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I. Introduction
When protests broke out across France last year over a proposal that would have allowed
employers to fire younger workers in their first two years of employment without having to show
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good cause, many Americans were perplexed.2 The rule that employers may fire employees for
almost any reason, and without having to give a justification, seems natural and perhaps
necessary in American culture. On the other hand, the U.S. has a long tradition of exceptions to
this rule. Making it illegal to fire employees for certain reasons, for example their race or union
sympathies, now also seems natural and necessary. It is a law school truism that every legal rule
has exceptions. But it is a significant problem if a rule, through its substance or underlying
assumptions, vitiates what are meant to be important exceptions to the rule. The “American”
rule of employment at-will creates such a problem. The at-will rule, a common law doctrine
from the late nineteenth century, is crippling the effectiveness of the two most important
exceptions to that doctrine, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 and the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA),4 two of the most significant federal statutes of the twentieth century. Atwill doctrine has long been debated on its own merits, and it is often cited as an area in which
exceptions are swallowing the rule.5 But scholars have largely ignored the opposite effect the
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For a good discussion of these events in France, see William Pfaff, France: The Children’s
Hour, The New York Review of Books, Vol. LIII, No. 8, (May 11, 2006), at 40.
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-15 (2005).
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29 U.S. C. § 151, et seq., 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
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“Since 1985, at least two hundred articles have critiqued some aspect of employment at will,”
Robert Bird, Rethinking Wrongful Discharge, a Continuum Approach, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 517,
517 (2004). Calls to abolish the at-will rule on its own merits have been made for decades. See,
e.g., David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform: Employment
At Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 993 (1998); Kenneth Sprang, Beware the
Toothless Tiger: a Critique of the Model Employment Termination Act, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 849,
872 (1994) (employment at-will “is a lumbering dinosaur that can no longer be rationally
defended”); Clyde Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute,
62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976); Lawrence Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On
Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967). For
defenses of the rule, see, e.g., J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term
2

rule has of swallowing hard-won exceptions to it. In fact, the at-will rule is inherently destructive
of rights widely viewed as fundamental, and this must be considered in debates about
employment discrimination law, labor law, and the future of employment at-will itself.
While the NLRA and Title VII have recently celebrated their 70th and 40th anniversaries
respectively, these two laws, the most far-reaching attempts to provide rights to employees at the
workplace in U.S. history, are in crisis and have been for some time. The titles alone of law
review articles in major journals reflect this view: labor law has “ossified”;6 American workers
have “lost the right to strike” and other significant rights.7 And the numbers are discouraging:
union density in the private sector is now under 10 percent, down from a high of nearly 35
percent decades ago.8 Views of Title VII are often equally grim. Scholars lament that the law
has been “ineffective in combating employment discrimination,”9 and that the hopes that it

Employment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837 (the rule is
ftlinejustified because the parties know what they are contracting for); Richard Epstein, In
Defense of the Contract At-Will 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984) (at-will is based on freedom of
contract principles); Richard Power, A Defense of the Employment At Will Rule, 27 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 881 (1983).
6

Cynthia Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527
(2002).
7

James Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 518 (2004).
8

Joseph Slater, Homeland Security vs. Workers’ Rights? What the Federal Government
Should Learn from History and Experience, and Why 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. LAW 295, 300 & n.
11 (2004).
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Ann McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent
National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1444-45 (1996).
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initially inspired have been “significantly unrealized.”10 Again, the numbers are discouraging:
plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases fare less well than plaintiffs in nearly any other
category of civil litigation.11
There are various diagnoses for these ailments and some prescriptions for improvements,
but these generally focus on factors specific to either labor or employment discrimination law
doctrines. Labor law scholars have criticized questionable court interpretations of the NLRA and
decried the weak remedies for employer unfair labor practices (ULPs), notably for the ULP of
firing employees for supporting a union organizing drive.12 Title VII scholars complain that the
burden-shifting procedural structure of individual disparate treatment discrimination cases is
unnecessarily complex and confusing at best, and inherently anti-plaintiff at worst.13 They also
doubt whether current legal doctrines can cope with unconscious bias or with deeply-imbedded
structural discrimination.14
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Michelle Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination
Law, 62 WASH & LEE L. REV. 3, 5 (2005).
11

See, e.g., Kevin Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg, and Stewart Schwab, How EmploymentDiscrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS &
EMPLOYMENT POL’Y J. 547 (2003); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases
So Hard to Win? 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001).
12

See, e.g., Robert M. Worster, III, If It’s Hardly Worth Doing, It’s Hardly Worth Doing
Right: How the NLRA’s Goals Are Defeated Through Inadequate Remedies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV.
1073 (2004); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1787-91 (1983); see Section II-B-2, supra.
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See section III-A, infra. “This emphasis on procedure comes at the expense of discussions
of what one naively might call ‘substance.’” Deborah Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate
Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH L.REV. 2229, 2229-30 (1995).
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See, e.g., Samuel Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law,
94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5-10 (2006) (discussing the “importance of unconscious and subtle bias”);
Kathryn Abrams, Cross-Dressing in the Master’s Clothes, 109 YALE L. J. 745, 758 (2000) (Title
4

This article argues that beyond problems within each area of law, a common thread
consistently subverts the effectiveness of both the NLRA and Title VII: at-will employment.
Under the at-will doctrine, absent an applicable contractual or specific legal exception, an
employer may discharge an employee for any reason, good or bad, or for no reason at all.15
Sometimes called “the American rule,” it is the default rule in the U.S. but is almost unique to
America.16 Western European and other industrial democracies have generally abandoned it in
favor of just cause discharge rules.17

VII is unlikely to “actually alter the dominant norms of most workplaces or the kinds of roles that
men and women play within them”) Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1161 (1995) (Title VII rules do not adequately deal with subtle or unconscious
stereotyping). See Section 3-A, supra.
15

See, e.g., Ken Matheny and Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and the ‘Un-American’ Labor
Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (2004); William Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the
Twenty-First Century: Everything Old is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 261 &
n. 3, (2002) citing, e.g., Rebecca Hanner White, EMPLOYMENT LAW AND EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION: ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONCEPTS 8 (1998).
16

See 82 AM. JUR. 2D WRONGFUL DISCHARGE § 31 (referring to the “American rule” of at-will
employment); Matthew Finkin, Second Thoughts on a Restatement of Employment Law, 7 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 282 (2005) (“The draft restates the at-will, or ‘American rule’”). The rule
was first stated in Horace Wood, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER & SERVANT § 134 (1877).
American courts then adopted it, and the term “American rule” was used in part to distinguish it
from the English common law rule that provided that the default employment contract was for a
set period during which the employee could not be terminated without cause. See Jenny
Clevenger, Arizona’s Employment Protection Act: Drawing a Line in the Sand Between The
Court and the Legislative, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 605, 606, n.7 (1997); section IV-A, supra.
17

“Other countries explicitly reject the basic American rule of employment at will,” Clyde
Summers, Worker Dislocation: Who Bears the Burden? A Comparative Study of Social Values in
Five Countries, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 1067-68 (1995); in “western Europe and nearly
all other countries” workers cannot be terminated without cause. Hoyt Wheeler, Brian Klaas, and
Douglas Mahony, WORKPLACE JUSTICE WITHOUT UNIONS (2004), 1. See section IV-D-3, supra.
5

This article first analyzes the most common explanations for problems with the NLRA
and Title VII. It then argues that these critiques are not sufficient and that employment-at-will is
a central, debilitating problem for labor and antidiscrimination law. To do so, it relies on
experiences from two other areas of law. For the NLRA, this article compares public sector
employment, where workers are organizing quite successfully (public sector union density is
nearly 40 percent).18 Government employees have achieved this success under state laws that
contain most or all of the rules critics consider problematic in the NLRA.19 But one key
difference is that public workers eligible to join unions are usually not employees at-will.20
For Title VII, this article looks beyond the employment law realm and compare rules
governing claims of discrimination in juror selection under the Supreme Court’s decision in
Batson v. Kentucky21 and its progeny. Analogous to the role of at-will in Title VII law, attorneys
in criminal cases, while barred from striking prospective jurors because of their race, are still
allowed to strike for almost an unlimited number of reasons (no matter how silly), or no for
reason at all.22 The burden-shifting procedural structure for proving race discrimination in
Batson cases is the same as that which the Supreme Court set out in McDonnell Douglas v.
Green,23 for Title VII individual disparate treatment cases (the majority of individual claims).
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See section II-C-1.
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See section II-C-2.
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476 U.S. 79 (1986).

22

See section III-B-1.
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McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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Batson rules have been so ineffective that scholars and a Supreme Court Justice have recently
suggested that all juror strikes should be done for cause, the equivalent of requiring just cause for
discharge from employment.24
This article then reviews the history, significance, and current utility of the at-will rule,
and compares that to the history, significance, and potential utility of the NLRA and Title VII.
The at-will rule is of more recent vintage than many might suspect, and from its inception, there
have been many attempts to create exceptions to it. Today, numerous, small, and often unclear
inroads have been made into the at-will rule. This has made the law less comprehensible and
predictable, offering uncertainty to employers yet relatively scant protection to employees.
At the same time, the cost of at-will rules is the lack of an effective labor and antidiscrimination regime. The exceptions codified by the NLRA (the right to form unions and act
collectively) and Title VII (the right to be free from types of employment discrimination that
have placed extraordinary disadvantages on women, minorities, and other groups throughout
U.S. history) express core principles that are nearly universally accepted in the legal community
and society at large.25 At-will rules permeate boundaries and undermine decisions society has
made about fundamental rights in the workplace in a way that should not be ignored.
24

See section III-B-2.
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There are no noticeable calls for the repeal of those portions of Title VII or the NLRA that
prohibit discharge on the grounds of race, sex, religion, or union sympathies. Richard Epstein,
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992)
(questioning the need and justification for Title VII) is notable primarily because it is such an
outlier in modern legal and political thought. See, e.g., Nancy Dowd, Liberty vs. Equality: In
Defense of Privileged White Males, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV 429, 432 (1993) (“Epstein’s biggest
failure is his refusal to confront and analyze scholarly work that undermines or challenges the
fundamental basis of his opinion”; FORBIDDEN GROUNDS “is not an intellectual argument, it is a
political polemic with little intellectual credibility.”)
7

II. Employment At-Will Undermines Labor Law
A. Do Americans Simply Not Want to Join Unions?
Before worrying about what ails labor law, we should first ask, how do we know anything
is wrong? Does the low union density in the private sector (currently under 10 percent)26 indicate
the system is broken? Or is that argument just special pleading from labor representatives and
sympathizers that ignores the reality that unions are simply less attractive to American workers
than they used to be? Significant evidence suggests the latter explanation is, in fact, false.
First, polls consistently show that at least one-third of all nonunionized workers would
vote in favor of union representation if given the chance to do so.27 Indeed, surveys repeatedly
find that between one-third28 and one-half29 of American workers not in unions say that they
would like to be in one. For example, a recent article in Business Week explained that “[f]ully
half of all nonunion U.S. workers say they would vote yes if a union election were held at their
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In 1983, private sector union density was almost 16.5 percent; in 2001, it was 9.0 percent.
Katherine Stone, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING
WORKPLACE (2004), at 196.
27

Kate Brofenbrenner, et al., “Introduction,” in ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON
UNION STRATEGIES (1998), at 3-4, citing, e.g., Peter D. Hart Associates and the Mellman Group,
Summary of Opinion Research on Living Standards (1996). Estlund, Ossification at 1528, notes
the “representation gap” between the desire for and the supply of union representation.
28

Seymore Lipset and Noah Meltz, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN UNIONISM: WHY AMERICANS
LIKE UNIONS MORE THAN CANADIANS DO BUT JOIN MUCH LESS (2004), at 80.
29

Lipset and Meltz, PARADOX OF AMERICAN UNIONISM, at 94-95 (48.2 percent of employees
not in a union said they would “definitely” or “probably” vote for one); Matheny and Crain,
Disloyal Workers, at 1747, citing Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers, WHAT WORKERS WANT
(1999), at 89.
8

company today, up from about 40% throughout the 1990s.”30 Another study concluded that the
“natural” rate of union membership in the mid-1990s – the rate if choice were not subject to
undue coercion – would have been 44 percent.31
Second, as noted above, American workers in the public sector have a high union density
(suggestively close to the ‘natural’ rate for the private sector): about 40 percent. This figure is
especially striking given that the majority of government employees are covered by state and
local laws which are generally not as generous as the NLRA. For example, only twenty-nine
states generally allow their public workers to bargain collectively.32 Rates of unionization in the
public sector are thus a strong counter-argument to those who argue that Americans are simply
culturally disinclined to join unions.33 Unless one assumes that Americans who happen to work
for a government body – from police to secretaries, from teachers to janitors – are entirely
different sorts of people than Americans who happen to work for private employers, this is strong

30

Quoted in Charles Morris, THE BLUE EAGLE: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE
AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2005), 209.
31

Freeman and Rogers, WHAT WORKERS WANT, at 89.

32

See section II-C, supra.

33

For a sensitive articulation of the cultural argument, see Lipset and Meltz, THE PARADOX OF
AMERICAN UNIONISM 6 (“the difference in culture and values between the United States and
Canada . . . contributes significantly” to the different rates of unionization). Even these authors,
however, argue that “a major component” of the difference in unionization rates is the “greater
difficulty that Americans have in joining unions compared with Canadians”; this, in turn, is
attributable to differences in labor laws and enforcement of such laws. Id., 6. Lipset and Meltz
simply attribute the differences in legal regimes to different cultures. Id., 6, 92. Unfortunately,
they discuss public sector unions in only about two pages of a book of over 200 pages. Id., 127,
134-35. They do not discuss how culture can explain why janitors, secretaries, and workers in
other occupations in America have organized at such a higher level of union density in the public
sector than in the private.
9

evidence for the claim that American workers do in fact want to join unions in a much higher
percentage than current private sector unionization rates reflect.
Thus it appears that the NLRA is not fulfilling its function of allowing a significant
number of American workers in the private sector a free choice to join labor unions. Why not?
B. The Established Critiques of the NLRA
Scholars, unionists, and union sympathizers have complained about the inefficacy of the
NLRA for decades. In the early 1980s, members of the Critical Legal Studies movement strongly
criticized labor law doctrines.34 Outside the academy, Richard Trumka, then the vice-president
of the AFL-CIO said, in 1987: “I say abolish the [NLRA]. Abolish the affirmative protections of
labor that it promises but does not deliver.”35 In 1993, Lane Kirkland, then president of the AFLCIO, announced that labor law was “not sufficient to ensure working people of their basic right
to join a trade union. Rather, it has been perverted and has become a tool in the hands of those
who would dominate and suppress working people.”36 In 2002, law professor Cynthia Estlund
wrote that “[l]abor law has shrunk in its reach and its significance, and is clearly ailing.”37 A

34

See, e.g., Karl Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness: 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978). For a summary of
various authors in the field, see Joseph Slater, The Rise of Master-Servant and the Fall of Master
Narrative: A Review of LABOR LAW IN AMERICA, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 141 (1994).
35

Estlund, Ossification, at 1608, n. 334, quoting Richard L. Trumka, Why Labor Law Has
Failed, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 871, 881 (1987); see also “Kirkland Says Many Unions Avoiding
NLRB,” 132 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 13 (1989) (then-AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland would
prefer no law because current labor law “forbids us to show solidarity and direct union support”).
36

Quoted in Slater, The Rise of Master-Servant, at 142.

37

Estlund, Ossification, at 1527-28.
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recent report stresses that U.S. labor law “Fails U.S. Democratic Standards.”38 Much of this
criticism has focused on two factors: adverse case law that reads union rights out of the text of
the NLRA, and weak remedies for employer violations.
1. The Canon of Problematic Cases
For over two decades, scholars have pointed to a list of now nearly canonical court
decisions that both seriously undermined union rights and seemed at odds with the statutory
language of the NLRA. For example, in 1983, James Atleson’s Values and Assumptions in
American Labor Law39 analyzed a series of such cases (discussed in more detail below),
including Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. NLRB,40 First National Maintenance Corp. v NLRB,41
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,42 Textile Workers of America v. Darlington Mfg.
Co.,43 and Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. NLRB.44 In 2004, James Pope critiqued these same cases,
except that Babcock was replaced by a more recent case on the same sub-topic of labor law,
38

Gorden Lafer, “Free and Fair? How Labor Law fails U.S. Democratic Election Standards,”
(American Rights at Work, June 2005), available at
http://araw.org/docUploads/FreeandFair%20FINAL%2Epdf, at 9. Lafer describes employers’
superior rights of access to employees; lack of protections against economic coercion by
employers; lack of guarantees that the will of voters in union representation elections will be
implemented on a reasonable schedule, and no meaningful enforcement for violators of election
procedures.
39

James Atleson, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983).

40

306 U.S. 240 (1939).

41

452 U.S. 666 (1981).

42

304 U.S. 333 (1938).

43

380 U.S. 263 (1965).

44

351 U.S. 105 (1956). Atleson, Values and Assumptions, at 234-35 lists the pages on which
each of these cases is discussed.
11

Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB.45 Also in 2004, Ken Methany and Marion Crain discussed, among
others, MacKay Radio, Fansteel, Darlington Mfg., First National Maintenance, and Lechmere.46
These court decisions are seen as so crucial to modern labor relations that many articles
focus on finding a theme that would explain how these devastating and seemingly incorrectly
decided cases could have come out the way they did. Did Courts “deradicalize” the NLRA, as
Karl Klare argued over twenty-five years ago?47 Did the Court import “values and assumptions”
from common law master-servant rules to undercut NLRA rules, as Atleson wrote? Is it, as
Matheny and Marion Crain say, that courts read in an employee “duty of loyalty” that eviscerates
worker rights in various contexts?48 Or, as Pope contends, did the Supreme Court implicitly
constitutionalize property rights of employers that then trumped the NLRA?49
While all these authors make convincing points, the purpose here is not to explain these
cases, but rather to understand the effect they have and to weigh that along side the effect of atwill rules. Although the results of these cases were questionable and the rules they created were
indeed problematic, most of these same rules exist in the public sector, where unions are doing
much better. Therefore, the legal rules most often cited as creating the biggest problems for labor
are not, in themselves, a sufficient explanation for private sector labor’s troubles.

45

Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992)

46

Matheny and Crain, Disloyal Workers, at 1721 & nn. 119 & 121, 1723-24.

47

Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 265-70 (1978).

48

Matheny and Crain, Disloyal Workers, e.g. at 1726-30.

49

See, e.g., Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, 529-33 (explaining that 5th
Amendment concerns lay behind the Court’s decision in MacKay Radio).
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MacKay Radio, a central case in the canon, allows employers to “permanently replace”
workers who participate in a legal strike over “economic” issues.50 Economic issues are matters
regarding wages, hours, and working conditions.51 Thus, strikes designed to win what most
workers join unions to get (better compensation, more reasonable hours) often result in strikers
losing their jobs to permanent replacements. Critics of MacKay point to NLRA language stating
that “[n]othing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any
way the right to strike.52 Also, NLRA §7 lists striking as a protected activity, and NLRA
§8(a)(1) bars employer interference with protected activities. A recent article concluded that this
case, “which came close to making a mockery of the statute’s bold language about the right to
strike, neither explained its rationale nor justified its result.”53
Still, the rule remains that while an employer may not fire employees for taking part in a
legal strike, it may permanently replace them: a distinction with (for most workers) only a
hollow, technical difference.54 Due to this rule, employers increasingly see strikes as

50

304 U.S. 333, 345-46.

51

Workers who strike because the employer has committed a ULP generally are entitled to
reinstatement after making an unconditional offer to return to work. Douglas Ray, Calvin
Sharpe, and Robert Strassfeld, UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAW (2d ed., 2005) 222-31.
52

NLRA, ch. 372, §13, 49 Stat. 449, 457 (1935), quoted in Pope, How American Workers Lost
the Right to Strike, 525, 529; 29 U.S.C. §163 (2005).
53

Julius Getman and F. Ray Marshall, The Continuing Assault on the Right to Strike, 79 TEX
L. REV. 703, 717 (2001).
54

Being “permanently replaced” is not exactly the same thing as being fired, but it has the
same practical result in at least many cases, and in nearly all cases in which the employer desires
that result. A “permanently replaced” employee has no right to be reinstated after a strike if the
employer has filled the worker’s position with a permanent replacement. Only if the job is
unfilled after the strike or if the position later becomes open and the employee is still available —
factors outside the employee’s control — does the employee have the right to return to her job,
13

opportunities to break unions. In recent years, employers have been more likely to threaten
permanent replacements than unions have been to threaten strikes.55
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. held that sit-down strikes were illegal, even where the
employer had committed a number of serious ULPs. The strikers could not be reinstated, even
though their strike would not have occurred but for the employer’s violation of the law. Here
too, the rule – employers may fire workers for engaging in slow-downs and other partial strike
activities – was arguably contrary to the text and intent of the NLRA.56 Pope argues the Court
wrongly allowed the employer’s property rights to trump the statutory rights of the workers.57
Darlington Mfg. held that it did not violate the NLRA for an employer to close its shop
purely out of anti-union bias.58 This rule is also arguably contrary to the meaning and intent of
the NLRA. In addition to §8(a)(1), which bars interference with §7 rights such as organizing,
NLRA §8(a)(3) bars employers from discriminating against employees based on their attitudes
toward unions.59 Darlington explained that courts could not force an employer to remain in

Laidlaw Corp., 171 NLRB 1366, 1368-70 (1968), enf’d, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. den.,
397 U.S. 920 (1970).
55

Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, at 527-528. The MacKay Court did
not give what has become the latter-day justification for this rule: that employers being struck
need to attract replacement workers by offering them permanent positions. Id., at 529.
56

See Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, 526.

57

Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, 520-21.

58

380 U.S. 263, 269-73. The case added a subsidiary rule, that “partial” plant closings can
sometimes violate the NLRA. 380 U.S. at 274-76. But closing a single plant unrelated to other
businesses of the owner is clearly legal.
59

See Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, 545-50, offering his own critique
and quoting labor law scholar Clyde Summers describing the decision as “inherently incredible.”
14

business,60 which is true but hardly persuasive. Money damages are available in a wide variety
of legal actions against corporations (and sometimes corporate officers) even if the corporation
goes out of business. There is no reason such damages could not be available for employers who
close their businesses for reasons the NLRA seemingly should prohibit.
First National Maintenance held that unions had no right to bargain over an employer’s
decision to close a plant, despite language in the NLRA obligating employers and unions to
negotiate over “wages, hours, and conditions of work.”61 The Court nonetheless deemed certain
topics merely “permissive” subjects of bargaining (a term that appears nowhere in the NLRA’s
text). Unions, the Court held, cannot insist on bargaining over “permissive” subjects, and the
subject of plant closing, despite its actual, obvious, destructive impact on wages, hours, and
working conditions, was held to be merely permissive.62
Lechmere limited access of union organizers to workers. It upheld the employer’s right to
exclude non-employee union organizers from its property in practically, if not literally, all
cases.63 Again, this interpretation seems contrary to statutory language, which grants §7

60

380 U.S. at 270, rejecting the “proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go
out of business if he wants. . . .”
61

NLRA §§ 8(d) and 8(a)(5), 49 Stat. 452, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158(d) and 158 (a)(5).
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452 U.S. 666, 677-87.
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502 U.S. 527 at 532-39. The exception is for situations in which “the inaccessibility of
employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by non-employees to communicate with
them through usual channels,” 502 U.S. at 537. This has been interpreted extremely narrowly
and is used very rarely. Ray, Sharpe, and Strassfeld, UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAW, at 71.
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organizing rights to “employees” generally, and is not limited to employees of a particular
employer being organized (professional union organizers are, after all, employees of the union).64
More recent cases could be added. Perhaps one of the poorest pieces of statutory
interpretation in the Supreme Court’s recent history was CWA v. Beck.65 Beck and its progeny66
established burdensome requirements for allowing members of union bargaining units to have
refunded to them that portion of their dues money collected pursuant to union security clauses
that their union spent on activities “not related to collective bargaining” (mainly politics and
most organizing activities).67 While this may or may not be good public policy, it flies directly in
the face of explicit statutory language and was contrary to the interpretation of the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the agency charged with interpreting the NLRA.68

64

See Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, 541-44, for a more detailed
critique of the reasoning in Lechmere.
65

487 U.S. 735 (1988).
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See, e.g. California Saw & Knife Works, 320 NLRB 224 (1995), enf’d sub. non. Int’l Ass’n
of Machinists v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir 1998) (detailing requirements for dues-rebate
calculations, rebates, and challenges to those processes).
67

Estlund, Ossification, 1585-86 contrasts the Supreme Court’s priorities in Beck and
Lechmere: “The right of objectors to refrain from supporting unions and most union organizing
is so important that it justifies imposing onerous procedural burdens on the union, while the right
of unions and their members to organize is so unimportant that . . . it does not justify imposing
the trivial burden on employer's property rights that is entailed by granting organizers access to a
parking lot.”
68

NLRA § 8(a)(3) states that “nothing” in the NLRA “shall preclude an employer from
making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment
membership therein.” Section 8(a)(3) then gives the following specific exceptions to this general
rule: employers cannot discriminate against employees for nonmembership in a union if
“membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to
tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or
retaining membership” (emphasis supplied). Thus, as the dissent in Beck explained, the “plain
language” of these provisions “permits an employer and union to enter into an agreement
16

Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB69 also limits union rights in a way
apparently inconsistent with statutory language. It held that even if a majority of employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit sign cards stating that they wish to be represented by a union and
present such cards to their employer, the employer is not required to recognize the union.
Instead, employers can reject this “card check” procedure and can force unions to use the
NLRB’s election procedure, a process often fraught with delays and employer abuses.70 Yet no
part of the NLRA states that an election is required or is even a preferred way of workers
choosing whether to be represented by workers. Section 9(a) of the statute states:
“representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority
of employees . . . shall be the exclusive representative of all the employees.” The “designate or
select” language does not mandate elections if an employer wants one, and card check would
seem an acceptable way a union could be “designated or selected.”
Also, in NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc.,71 the Supreme Court again
interpreted the NLRA in a way contrary to union interests by reading the term “supervisor” quite
requiring all employees, as a condition of continued employment, to pay uniform periodic dues.”
487 U.S. 735, 765 (Blackmun, J. dissenting). Further, the Court rejected the NLRB’s
interpretation of §8(a)(3), which had adopted this plain meaning interpretation. As the dissent
correctly noted, “were there any ambiguity in the meaning of § 8(a)(3) – which there is not – the
Court would be constrained to defer” to the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA; it was at
minimum a reasonable interpretation. 487 U.S. at 769, n.6 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
69

419 U.S. 301, 309-10 (1974).

70

Union election campaigns “regularly feature employers’ exercise of their lawful yet
disproportionate authority to help shape election results, as well as employers’ use of their power
to affect outcomes unlawfully but with relative impunity.” James Brudney, Neutrality
Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms,
90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 825 (2005).
71

532 U.S. 706, 713-16 (2001).
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expansively. This hurt unions because the NLRA excludes supervisors from its coverage.72
Thus, if an employee is deemed to be a “supervisor,” not only can she not join a union, she can
be dismissed legally for supporting a union (or, for that matter, for not opposing a union). Worth
noting here, that is true because supervisors are at-will and are no longer protected by NLRA
rules. Kentucky River ensured that a greater percentage of employees would be supervisors
through a questionably broad interpretation of the rule that an employee is a supervisor if she
exercises “independent judgment” in directing the work of another employee.73
2. Weak Remedies
Scholars and union advocates often claim that the NLRA provides inadequate responses
to employer ULPs, especially for employers simply firing union supporters.74 Studies confirm
that private sector employers routinely fire or discipline workers for supporting unions. A recent
report estimated that one in three employers in the U.S. faced with union organizing drives
engages in this practice.75 This replicates an earlier study, which found that from 1992-95, more
than a third of employers fired workers for union activity during NLRB elections.76 Another
72

29 U.S.C. § 152(12).

73

The case involved certain nurses, whom the NLRB had held were not supervisors. The
NLRB reasoned that the application of “ordinary professional or technical judgment in directing
less-skilled employees to deliver services” was not “independent judgment” for the purpose of
the supervisory exclusion. The Court disagreed, thus removing many workers from the NLRA’s
protections. 532 U.S. 706, 713-16; Estlund, Ossification, at 1560 & n. 137.
74

Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep, at 1787-91 (1983); Worster, III, If it’s Hardly Worth Doing,
at 1083; see note 11 infra.
75

Chirag Mehta and Nik Theodore, “Undermining the Right To Organize: Employer Behavior
During Union Representation Campaigns,” (2005), available at
http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/docUploads/UROCUEDcompressedfullreport%2Epdf
76

Brofenbrenner, et al., “Introduction,” 5.
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report found that one of four employers illegally fires workers for union activity during
organizing campaigns, and on average, these employers fire four workers per election
campaign.77 A study in the late 1990s concluded that employers illegally fire or otherwise
retaliate against one of every eighteen private sector workers who support a union during a union
organizing campaign.78 Employees get the message: a poll found that 79 percent of workers
thought it was either “somewhat” or “very” likely that employees “will get fired if they try to
organize a union.”79
Of course, it violates the NLRA to fire an employee for supporting a union.80 But usually
the only relief wrongfully discharged employees can receive is reinstatement and back-pay,
minus whatever the employee earned or should have earned after being illegally fired.81 No
emotional or punitive damages are available, as there are in Title VII cases of disparate
treatment,82 nor are there double damages, as the Fair Labor Standards Act provides,83 nor do
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Kate Brofenbrenner and Tom Juravich, “It Takes More Than House Calls: Organizing to
Win with a Comprehensive Union Building Strategy,” in Brofenbrenner, et al., eds., ORGANIZING
TO WIN, at 22, 28.
78

Charles Morris, A Tale of Two Statutes: Discrimination for Union Activity Under the NLRA
and RLA, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 317, 330 (1998).
79

Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers, “Who Speaks for Us? Employee Representation in a
Nonunion Labor Market,” in Bruce Kaufman and Morris Kleiner, eds., EMPLOYEE
REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS (1993), 29.
80

See NLRA §§ 7, 8(a)(1) (giving employees the right to organize unions and making it an
employer ULP to coerce, interfere, or restrain employees in exercising that right).
81

Worster, III, If it’s Hardly Worth Doing, at 1083.

82

In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. §1981A(a)(1) to allow
punitive damages in Title VII claims of intentional discrimination. Under the NLRA, punitive
damages are not even available for repeat violators. See Lafer, “Free and Fair” at 25.
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successful plaintiffs receive attorneys’ fees, as they typically do in these and other types of
employment law cases.84 Under the NLRA, it is possible, but in practice quite difficult, to get
injunctions against employer discrimination during organizing campaigns. Beyond that, the only
remedies are cease and desist orders and orders that employers post notices that they have
violated the NLRA.85 This is an unnecessarily cramped interpretation of statutory language that
authorizes the NLRB to “take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with
or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of” the NLRA.86 Some of the oft-criticized
canonical cases that hurt labor are cases that involve limitations on remedies.87
Not only are remedies weak, but they are often seriously delayed.88 In 2003, the median
wait for a ULP case pending an NLRB ruling was nearly three years from the filing of a charge,
83

FLSA § 216(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

84

29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and 29 U.S.C. §2000e-6(k) require attorneys’ fees for successful
plaintiffs under the FLSA and Title VII, respectively. Because the NLRA litigates what it finds
to be meritorious ULP charges, attorneys’ fees are less of a cost item for workers in such cases
than in individual employment law cases, which plaintiffs typically file in court. But unions do
incur costs in investigating and filing charges, and they often expend resources aiding the NLRB
in its attempt to prosecute charges (e.g., by filing amicus briefs). More importantly here, from
the employer’s perspective, the prospect of paying out a significant amount of money in
attorney’s fees does not act as a disincentive in NLRA cases, as it does in employment law cases.
85

Estlund, Ossification, at 1566; Worster, III, If it’s Hardly Worth Doing, 1076-83.
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NLRA §10(c), 29 U.S.C. §160(c) (emphasis supplied).
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Methany and Crain, Disloyal Workers,1723-24 & n. 123, discuss Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197-98 (1941) (workers fired in violation of the NLRA have a duty to
mitigate damages by trying to seek other employment); Pope, How American Workers Lost the
Right to Strike, 535, criticizes Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938) for holding
that the NLRB’s power to remedy ULPs was remedial and not punitive.
88

In 2003, the median wait for a ULP case pending an NLRB ruling was nearly three years
from the filing of a charge, and employers who choose to appeal the NLRB’s ruling to the federal
courts can add years of further delay. Estlund, Ossification, at 1567.
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and employer appeals of NLRB rulings to federal courts often add years of further delay.89 In the
context of an organizing campaign, this typically means that the status quo of no union is
maintained.90 Further, the reinstatement remedy is problematic in practice. The majority of
workers discriminated against decline reinstatement. One can imagine why a reasonable worker
would not wish to return to a company that had illegally fired her, but lengthy delays make this
attitude even more likely, and thus make this remedy worth even less.91
The incentives this creates are troubling. James Pope notes that “[f]rom a cost-benefit
point of view, it is often profitable to fire union advocates.”92 Gordon Lafer explains that
“[b]eyond the delays . . ., there are virtually no penalties for those ultimately found guilty.”93
Thus, “[r]ational employers might well decide that the modest penalty for firing a few union
supporters was worth the benefit of scaring hundreds more into abandoning the cause of
unionization.”94 Similarly, Kenneth Roth, the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch,
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Lafer, “Free and Fair?” at 24; Weiler, Promises to Keep, at 1787-1803.
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Lafer, 22-23.
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Wooster, III, If it’s Hardly Worth Doing at 1081, citing Leonard Page, New Directions for
the Next National Labor Relations Board, 2001 L. Rev. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 1063, 1066 (2001).
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“If the employer can avoid even a modest wage increase, the savings are likely to exceed
many times over the costs of any back-pay awards that the Board might eventually assess.”
Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, 534, citing, e.g., Morris Kleiner, “What
Will it Take? Establishing the Economic Costs to Management of Noncompliance with the
NLRA,” in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 137, 140-46 (Sheldon Friedman,
et al. eds., 1994).
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Lafer, “Free and Fair?” at 25 (emphasis in original).
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Lafer, “Free and Fair?” at 25.
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writes that “[l]abor law is so weak that companies often treat the minor penalties as a routine cost
of doing business, not a deterrent against violations.”95
Real world experiences support these critiques. Former NLRB General Counsel Leonard
Page describes “outrageous and pervasive violations” by employers which took place “on a
regular basis” during his tenure in the 1990s, noting that the remedies problem was “clearly
exemplified” by employer ULPs during union organizing campaigns.96 Another former NLRB
General Counsel, Fred Feinstein, discussing the aggressive and not infrequently illegal tactics of
Wal-Mart in opposing unions, explained that “even when the board charged companies like WalMart with illegal actions, the remedies often could not salvage an organizing drive crippled by
employer illegalities.” Even Business Week agreed that Wal-Mart’s illegal activities “carry
insignificant penalties.”97
In sum, the Supreme Court has issued many rulings adverse to labor and at least arguably
contrary to the plain meaning and intent of the NLRA. Also, inadequate remedies create serious
difficulties for unions, especially during organizing. The experience of the public sector,
however, raises challenging questions about the extent to which these rules in and of themselves
account for the low union density in the private sector. Almost all these rules apply in the public
sector as well, and unions are doing quite well there.
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Quoted in Wooster, III, If it’s Hardly Worth Doing, at 1083.
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Quoted in Wooster, III, If it’s Hardly Worth Doing, 1077.
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Quotes in Morris, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK, at 205. Morris describes some of Wal-Mart’s
tactics at id., 202-09.
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C. Lessons from the Public Sector
Public sector labor law rules vary tremendously by jurisdiction. Still, public sector labor
statutes are generally modeled on the NLRA, with the caveat that they often provide fewer of the
same sorts of rights. Yet even though nearly all the rules described above apply in the public
sector, they have not stopped public workers from organizing at a very impressive rate. Weak
remedies, for example, certainly hurt private sector unions. But no study discusses the fact that
public sector labor laws provide the same, weak remedies for employees fired for supporting
unions, and still public workers have organized at a rate quadruple that of private workers.
One key difference in the public sector is the absence of a background employment atwill rule that swallows the exception labor law was meant to create. Most public workers
eligible to join unions are covered by civil service rules that require some form of “just cause”
for discharge.98 Also, the Constitution gives them some substantive and procedural protections
in discharge cases. Thus, their employers can’t fire them with relative impunity at the first sign
of union organizing, as happens too frequently in the private sector.
1. The Similarities: The Canon of Cases in Public Sector Labor Law
Unlike private sector law, public sector labor laws come from state and local rules.
Currently, there are more than 110 separate statutes governing public sector labor relations,
augmented by many local ordinances and authority.99 Twenty-nine states and the District of
Columbia allow collective bargaining for all major groups of public employees; thirteen states
allow only one to four types of public workers to bargain; and eight do not allow any public
98

See, e.g. Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger, 865 and section II-C-2, supra.
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Richard Kearney, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, 58-59 (3d ed. 2001).
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workers to bargain.100 While these laws vary dramatically on some points (for example, only
twelve states allow any public workers to strike and many require arbitration and/or mediation to
settle bargaining impasses),101 public sector rules typically adopt the structure and substance of
the NLRA, except that they often provide fewer of the same sorts of rights.102 Notably, at least
most of the problematic rules described above are standard in public sector laws.103
First, topics of bargaining in the public sector are generally more limited than those in the
private sector.104 Indeed, the trend in the last decade has been to narrow the scope of bargaining
in public sector statutes.105 Public sector statutes typically include explicit “management rights”
language, which keeps more subjects out of the negotiating arena than does private sector law.
More subjects are permissive (the parties cannot negotiate about them unless both sides want to
do so) and more subjects are illegal (the parties cannot negotiate about them even if they wish) in
100

Kearney, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, 62, 66; Slater, Homeland Security vs.
Workers Rights? at 301 & n. 17.
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Slater, Homeland Security vs. Workers Rights? at 301.

102

See Harry Edwards, R. Theodore Clark, Jr. & Charles Craver, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR (4th ed.1991), 139-42.
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While unfortunately no hornbook lists the provisions of all or even most state public sector
labor laws, information can be gleaned from the following sources: Kearney, LABOR RELATIONS
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR; Joseph Grodin, Mary Weisberger & Martin Malin, PUBLIC SECTOR
EMPLOYMENT (2d ed., 2004); and Joyce Najita and James Stern, eds. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
THE PUBLIC SECTOR: THE EXPERIENCE OF EIGHT STATES (2001). For guides to state public sector
labor agencies across the country, often containing links to statutes and cases, see www.alara.org
or http://www.afscme.org/otherlnk/weblnk28.htm.
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See Grodin, Weisberger & Malin, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT, at 205-76 (discussing the
scope of bargaining in a variety of public sector jurisdictions). For an earlier piece showing that
the scope of bargaining was always narrower in the public sector, see Donald Wollett, The
Bargaining Process in the Public Sector: What is Bargainable? 51 OR. L. REV. 177 (1971).
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Grodin, Weisberger & Malin, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT, at 206.
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the public sector.106 Also, agencies and courts often read management rights language in public
sector statutes broadly, due to concerns that negotiations over the functioning of public bodies
can inhibit democratic control by the public and their elected representatives.107 Thus, the
problems created by First National Maintenance in the private sector are worse (from the union’s
perspective) in the public.
For example, layoffs and subcontracting, both mandatory topics in the private sector,108
are often not mandatory in public employment.109 In New Jersey, the decision to subcontract is
non-negotiable.110 A number of state statutes provide lengthy lists of specific topics that cannot
be bargained. Michigan’s statute provides that bargaining between a public school and a union
“shall not include” various subjects, including but not limited to the starting day for the school
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See Grodin, Weisberger & Malin, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT, at 213-219 (excerpting
statutory language from select states). For example, the Illinois Public Relations Act, 5 ILCS
315/4 Management Rights, provides: “Employers shall not be required to bargain over matters
of inherent managerial policy,” including “the functions of the employer, standards of services,
its overall budget, the organizational structure, and selection of new employees.” Id., at 213.
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Grodin, Weisberger & Malin, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT, at 205; Clyde Summers,
Bargaining in the Government’s Business: Principles and Politics, 18 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 265
(1987). For a good example, see San Jose Peace Officers v. City of San Jose, 78 Cal.App.3d
935, 946, 144 Cal. Reptr. 638, 645 (1978) (police department’s “use of force” policy not a
mandatory subject of bargaining, despite claims it implicated officer safety, because it required
“delicate judgment . . . best exercised by the appropriate legislative and executive officers”).
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For subcontracting, see Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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See, e.g. City of Brookfield v. Wisc. Employment Rel. Comm’n, 87 Wis.2d 819, 830, 275
N.W.2d 723, 728 (1979) (in Wisconsin, layoffs of public workers for budgetary reasons is not a
mandatory topic, because it “is a matter primarily related to the exercise of municipal powers and
responsibilities and the integrity of the political processes of municipal government).”
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Local 195 IFPTE v. State of New Jersey, 88 N.J. 393, 443 A.2d 187 (1982).
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year, required student contact time, subcontracting decisions, and who can be the policyholder of
an employee group insurance policy.111
The principle of Lechmere, that professional union organizers have greatly reduced rights
of access to employer property, has been endorsed by several state labor agencies in public sector
cases.112 Further, public employers may permissibly bar such organizers under First Amendment
rules concerning access to government property. For example, a recent Illinois case upheld a
school district’s policy of banning all non-employee union organizers from school property.
Under applicable First Amendment doctrine, the employer had acted lawfully in restricting nonemployee access because the union organizing activity took place in non-public fora; the
employer had not “opened its doors to public,” as it would for a play or basketball game.113
Rules allowing objections to dues payments applied in the public sector even earlier than
Beck created them in the private. The public sector cases were decided under the First
Amendment, but they are quite similar to the Beck line of cases, both in terms of the substantive
111

Grodin, Weisberger & Malin, Public Sector Employment, 214, citing Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. §423.215(3).
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SERB v. Napoleon City School Dist. Bd. of Ed.,13 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. ¶ 1254
(1996) (per Lechmere, non-employees have “less rights and protection regarding access to an
employer’s premises than employees”; statute does “not protect non-employee union organizers,
except in the rare case where the inaccessibility of employees renders the reasonable
communication attempts by non-employees ineffective”); Temple Ass’n of University
Professionals, Local 4531 v. Temple University, 23 Penn. Pub. Employee Rep. ¶ 23118 (1992)
(per Lechmere, “non-employees only have the right to enter an employer’s private property for
organizational purposes if no reasonable means of communication with the employees is
otherwise available.”)
113

SEIU Local 73 and Palatine Community Consolidated School Dist. #15, 18 Pub. Employee
Rep. for Illinois ¶ 1043 (2002). See also Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch.
Dist., 777 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1985), aff’d 479 U.S. 801 (1986) (teachers have a constitutional
right to use school bulletin boards and mail system to discuss unions, but outside organizers have
no right to similar access because they are non-public fora).
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right to object to certain expenditures and the burdensome procedures unions must adopt to deal
with objectors.114
Strikes by public workers are illegal even in the majority of jurisdictions that allow them
to bargain,115 and the definition of strike certainly includes slowdowns and other actions
prohibited by Fansteel in the private sector. Indeed, public sector statutes and cases often
specifically ban the practice referred to as “the blue flu”: government employees (originally
police, hence the “blue”) engaging in limited strike-like acts by calling in sick in groups.116
Striker replacement works differently in the public sector. Most obviously, only a
relatively small minority of states allow any public employees to strike legally. Where strikes are
legal, a very few decisions have hinted that public employers could use permanent
replacements,117 although research for this article revealed no case in which a government
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Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (First Amendment bars union security
clauses in public employment that require objecting members of a union bargaining unit who are
not members of a union to pay dues for purposes “unrelated to collective bargaining”); Chicago
Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986) (requiring more elaborate procedures than the
union had been using to administer dues rebate requests).
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Grodin, Weisberger & Malin, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT, at 292 (“many statutes go
beyond expressly prohibiting traditional strikes to prohibit . . . job actions, or concerted activities
as the ‘blue flu,’ where employees concertedly call in sick.”) See, e.g., City of Santa Ana, v.
Santa Ana Police Benevolent Ass’n, 255 Cal. Rptr. 688 (1989) (sickout by police officers
constituted illegal work stoppage and was properly enjoined); Broward Teachers Union, v.
School Bd. of Broward County, Fl., 30 Fl. Pub. Employee Rep. ¶ 304 (2004) (school board acted
appropriately in face of threatened “blue flu” by teachers).
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In SERB v. Central Ohio Transit Authority, 6 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. ¶ 6060 (1988), a
public labor board hearing officer noted the lack of precedent regarding permanent replacements
in the public sector, and labeled the issue “a very difficult one.” While he decided that in theory,
employers could use such replacements legally, there is no reported case in which an Ohio public
employer actually did use permanent replacements.
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employer actually used permanent replacements for strikers.118 Other cases, however, at least
imply that public sector strikers could not be permanently replaced. A California state labor
board decision noted that while in the private sector, employers could hire permanent
replacements for economic strikers, “the public sector employer does not have the economic
pressure devices available” to respond to strikes.119 While this decision did not explain why this
was true, it is likely in part because it is questionable whether participation in a legal120 strike is
“just cause” for dismissal or its nearly identical twin, “permanent replacement.”
Instead of strike rights, public sector unions must deal with a host of mechanisms to
resolve bargaining impasses that arguably are less effective. Some states provide arbitration, but
it can be mandatory or optional, binding or advisory, depending on the state. Some states
provide mediation as well as arbitration, some only allow mediation.121 Of course, these
mechanisms are only applicable to public workers who are allowed to bargain.
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A very few cases discuss whether an employer threatening to use replacement workers in
states that allow strikes is itself an employer ULP, but no case reported case involves a public
employer actually using permanent replacement. See Edward R. Melby and Village of Frankfort,
15 Pub. Employee Rep. for Illinois ¶ 2012 (1999) (statements about possibly using replacements
if there was a strike not a ULP under all the circumstances); SERB v. Central Ohio Transit
Authority, 7 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. ¶ 7041 (1989) (same); but cf. Shikellamy Ed. Ass’n v.
Shikellamy School Dist., 22 Pennsylvania Pub. Employee Rep. ¶ 22171 (1991) (School District’s
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Rep. for California ¶ 21107 (1990) (holding an intermittent strike to be a union ULP).
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Cf. Rockwell v. Crestwood School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 393 Mich. 616, 227 N.W. 2d 736
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Kearney, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, 236-37, 262-65 (describing which
states use which type of impasse resolution procedure).
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As to remedies, most public sector statutes simply copy the NLRA’s language, and public
sector agencies generally use the NLRB’s interpretation of that language.122 Thus, the standard
remedy for illegal discharge is, as in the private sector, reinstatement with backpay, minus
whatever the employee earned or should have earned.123 Punitive and emotional damages are not
available in public sector ULP cases, and generally neither are attorneys’ fees.124
Coverage of supervisors is perhaps the only area in which public sector labor law is
sometimes more union-friendly than the NLRA. A few state public sector statutes allow
supervisors to form unions, or define “supervisor” more narrowly than the NLRA does after
Kentucky River.125 On the other hand, recall that twenty-one states do not provide collective
bargaining rights to any public sector workers, or only grant such rights to employees in limited,
specific job categories. Thus, while in the public sector, supervisors in a few states can bargain
collectively where their private sector equivalents could not, those numbers are overwhelmed by
the large swaths of public employment in various parts of the country in which collective
bargaining is prohibited.
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On the whole, therefore, public sector labor statutes could be described as at most
providing “NLRA-lite” rights: the same type of rights as the NLRA provides, but fewer of them.
Yet, while at least most of the rules said to hurt private sector workers have been widely adopted
in the public sector, public workers still organize quite successfully. To give a striking example,
federal sector workers have a union density of 35 percent,126 despite the fact that under the law
that covers most federal workers,127 unions cannot bargain about wages, hours of work, or union
security clauses, among other things.128
2. The Difference: Just Cause in the Public Sector Instead of At-Will
So, given that the same weaknesses appear in private and public sector labor law, why is
union density so much higher in the public sector? A large part of the reason is that public
employers are not able to fire public workers engaged in union organizing as easily. This is
because public employees generally are not at-will due to civil service and related rules, and are
given substantive and procedural protections by the Constitution. In short, there is no underlying
rule of at-will to swallow the exception that the labor law is designed to create.
Civil service laws date from the late nineteenth century, and they are designed to protect
merit principles: public workers should be hired, fired, promoted, or demoted because of their
abilities, not as favors or punishments by political machine bosses. Thus, civil service rules
typically require some form of just cause to fire a covered employee. While not all public
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5 U.S.C. §7103(14); Slater, Homeland Security vs. Workers Rights?, at 303-04 (discussing
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officials are covered by just cause rules (policy-making officials typically are not, and there is
often a probationary period), the vast majority of public employees eligible to form unions are
covered by such rules.129
Additionally, the Constitution provides public workers with substantive and procedural
protections. As to substance, for example, it violates the First Amendment for public employers
to discriminate against their employees because of their union membership.130 Also, most public
employees cannot be fired for exercising certain Constitutional rights (cases use various
balancing tests). For example, in Connick v. Myers, the Supreme Court held that if public
employers discipline their employees for speech covered by the First Amendment, courts must
balance the interests of the employee as a citizen in commenting on matters of public concern,
and the interests of the State as an employer in promoting efficient public services.131
Many public employees also have Constitutionally-protected procedural rights when their
discharge is proposed. Civil service just cause rules (among other things) can create a property
interest in a job which cannot be taken away without due process.132 The Supreme Court has
held that an employee with a property interest in a job is entitled to both a relatively brief hearing
129
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prior to a proposed discharge and a more formal hearing after the discharge.133 These rules make
it more difficult for a public employer to discharge union supporters summarily in an attempt to
thwart a union organizing campaign. No such protections exist for private sector employees
wishing to unionize.
Further, under civil service just cause rules, the burden is on the employer to prove that a
valid reason existed for a discharge. In contrast, in a private sector ULP case, the burden is on
the employee to prove anti-union motivation.134 Thus, in the public sector, it is more difficult for
employers to win simply by asserting a whole host of reasons — ranging from sensible-sounding
to silly — for the discharge, hoping the fact-finder will give credence to it sufficient to defeat
plaintiff’s attempt to carry her burden of proof. Instead, government employers must carry the
burden to show that a particular, plausible, legitimate reason was in fact the real reason. Also,
this rule makes it less fruitful for employers to engage in multiple, time-wasting appeals, a
process that can undercut organizing even if the fired worker ultimately prevails. Thus, delays in
remedies, a serious problem in the private sector, are not a serious problem in the public.
It is surprising that of all the fine studies of U.S. labor law cited herein, none compares
public sector labor law or even gives the experiences in the public sector more than the briefest
mention. After all, in deciding the impact of legal rules on American workers, it would
seemingly be instructive to compare the public sector, in which many rules are largely the same,
but the outcome, at least as far as union density goes, is quite different.
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3. Non-Legal Factors: Employer Hostility
Legal rules, of course, are not the only factors that affect union density. In response to the
thesis above, it could be suggested that private sector employers are often much more
aggressively hostile toward unions135 than are their public sector counterparts. Indeed, some
have argued that what makes U.S. private sector labor relations unique among industrialized
democracies is the level of employer hostility toward unions.136 In addition to firing employees
for organizing, many private employers convincingly threaten to close or move their shops in
response to unionization. According to one survey, while only 1 percent of private sector
companies actually close up shop after their employees vote to unionize, 71 percent of
manufacturing employers threaten to close during a union election campaign.137 Although
privatization is a real threat to public sector unions, equivalent threats of moving the work are
more routine in the private sector.
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Granted, public employers are often not as aggressive about trying to defeat unions as
private employers, but many public employers do resist unionization vigorously.138 Also, while
there is a difference in employer behavior in the private and public sectors, the reasons for that
difference need to be unpacked.
Aggressive opposition to unions by public employers is more common than the
conventional wisdom would have it. One study notes that “the evidence suggests the majority of
employers in both sectors” oppose unionization.139 In the past few years, some large and
influential public employers have taken very aggressive actions against unions. The creation of
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was delayed for months due to the Bush
administration’s insistence that the tens of thousands of workers in the new, merged department
be denied collective bargaining rights they had enjoyed in predecessor agencies.140 And while
the statute creating the DHS permitted that agency to implement even weaker bargaining rights
than the federal sector statute allowed, the regulations the Bush administration promulgated
gutted bargaining rights so thoroughly that the D.C. Circuit upheld an injunction against the
regulations, on the grounds that they violated the minimal guarantee of “collective bargaining”
rights in the statute creating the DHS.141 For similar reasons, a court also recently struck down a
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similar attempt to gut union and related rights for employees of the Department of Defense.142
The Bush administration has succeeded in revoking the collective bargaining rights of thousands
of employees.143 Such attacks are not limited to the federal government: governors of Indiana
and Missouri recently revoked the collective bargaining rights of state employees in those
states.144
Still, the situation is worse in the private sector. One study found that private sector
employers were six times more likely to engage in ULPs, including discharges for union activity,
than public sector employers during union organizing campaigns.145 While a rate even one-sixth
of that in the private sector is still distressingly high, the difference is significant.
The question is, what causes this difference in behavior? The traditional answers are that
public employers are less concerned with competition through lower wages than are private
employers, and that political pressure inhibits public employers from expensive quasi-legal antiunion campaigns. While there is some truth to both those points, budget problems in a political
environment sympathetic to tax cutting and unsympathetic to “bureaucrats” have given public
employers incentives to fight unions for financial reasons and a political rhetoric to do so.
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Most importantly here, the legal context in the private sector allows opposition and
hostility to be turned into action more frequently and effectively. The background at-will rule
significantly facilitates the use of quasi-legal to illegal tactics against unions. In contrast, in the
public sector, the lack of this rule that swallows the exception inhibits such tactics by making
them less effective. Protections against arbitrary dismissals based in civil service or other rules
take away a “union avoidance” tool of easily firing union supporters, a tool that is too often used
in the private sector. Without the at-will rule, the labor law exception is enforceable.
III. Employment At-Will Undermines Anti-Discrimination Law
Title VII famously prohibits covered employers from taking adverse employment actions
such as discharge because of an employee’s sex, race, religion, or national origin.146 But this rule
sits uneasily with the background at-will rule that employers can discharge workers for any
reason other than a legally prohibited reason. Employees have the burden of proof to show that
illegal discrimination was the reason for the act; under at-will rules, it is legal for employers to
fire employees for any number of reasons including the morally and intellectually indefensible,
the petty, and the illogical. A realistic Title VII plaintiff must therefore try to disprove a wide
variety of “reasons” an employer is allowed to present or even suggest during litigation.
To confirm the difficulty Title VII puts on plaintiffs, this article will compare Batson
rules governing peremptory challenges to jurors. Batson rules are analogous to Title VII rules.
Historically, juror challenges could be made for any reason at all, or no reason; Batson made an
exception, barring challenges that plaintiff proved were based on illegal discrimination (e.g., for
race or gender). Batson rules for proof precisely track Title VII rules for individual disparate
146
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treatment cases. Thus, the failures of Batson are illuminating for Title VII cases. Commentators,
and even one Supreme Court Justice, have found this system so problematic that they have
suggested that only a rule requiring “cause” for striking a potential juror can effectively deal with
race discrimination in juror selection. This, of course, is exactly equivalent to recognizing that
the rule of at-will employment swallows the exception Title VII was designed to create.
A. Problems With Title VII and the Established Critiques
Serious problems exist in employment discrimination law. Title VII plaintiffs generally
fare worse than plaintiffs in most other types of suit, at every stage of the process.147 Before
going to court, plaintiffs must first file with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC); only about 15 percent of claims filed with the EEOC result in any relief for plaintiffs, a
rate generally lower than for other administrative claims. Plaintiffs lose employment
discrimination cases both at the trial level and on appeal at a greater rate than plaintiffs in almost
literally every other type of civil case.148 A recent study found that at the pretrial stage,
defendants won 98 percent of employment discrimination cases; compare that to a 66 percent
success rate for defendants in insurance cases. In cases tried before judges, employment
discrimination plaintiffs succeeded in 18.7 percent of the cases. In contrast, plaintiffs in
insurance cases won 43.6 percent of the time, and plaintiffs in personal injury cases won 41.8
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percent of the time.149 Further, employment discrimination defendants who lose at the trial level
do startlingly better on appeal (winning reversal over 43 percent of the time) than do employment
discrimination plaintiffs who lose at the trial level (winning reversal 5.85 percent of the time, a
lower rate than any other category of cases except prisoner habeas corpus cases).150
The difficulties that the at-will rule creates in employment discrimination cases would
seem fairly apparent. Plaintiffs must prove the employer acted because of one particular illegal
motivation (discrimination because plaintiff was a member of a protected category), while
employers will win if the fact-finder instead believes it was likely that the employer acted out of
an almost literally infinite number of alternative motivations. Still, many authors have focused
on other difficulties in the law.
There is a fascinating literature on the inability of Title VII doctrine to handle
unconscious discrimination and stereotyping. “Research suggests that unconscious biases and
cognitive stereotypes account for much of modern day discrimination,” Sheila Foster writes, and
these biases can “distort causal judgments about discrimination”151 Joan Williams gives an
example: an employer is likely to assume that a woman with children who is late to work is late
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because of her childcare responsibilities, but assume that a man with children who arrived late
was there because he was caught in traffic.152 This is convincing, but consider how a just cause
system would change this scenario. The employer would have to articulate and prove legitimate
reasons for taking an adverse action such as discharge, and inaccurate assumptions based on
stereotypes could be exposed.
Other critiques of Title VII law abound. Foster argues that the framework that slots Title
VII claims into either intentional or disparate impact discrimination categories obscures the true
issues.153 Michael Selmi cites false perceptions that discrimination cases are too easy to win and
that courts perceive Title VII claims as “generally unmeritorious, brought by whining
plaintiffs.”154 Anne McGinley shows that the EEOC is flooded with charges of discrimination
that it cannot adequately investigate.155
As with labor law, Title VII scholars point to some key cases that seemed to undermine
the rights the statute was designed to ensure.156 The Supreme Court’s decision in Wards Cove v.
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Atonio157 was so anti-plaintiff that Congress passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act158 to overturn it.159
Among other things, Wards Cove made it more difficult for plaintiffs to establish a relevant labor
market pool for comparison with an employer’s workforce;160 required plaintiffs to identify with
great specificity which employer practice caused discrimination, even where the employer used
multiple practices that might have had a discriminatory effect and the impact of any particular
practice was difficult to isolate;161 and lessened the employer’s burden to defend a practice with a
discriminatory effect from something like “business necessity” to something more like “job
related.”162 Beyond that, the 1991 Act “overturned or otherwise modified twelve Supreme Court
decisions that limited or severely curtailed civil rights law.”163
Much criticism focuses on the procedural burden-shifting rules of “McDonnell Douglas”
cases, suits alleging intentional (“disparate treatment”) discrimination against an individual.164
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First, plaintiff must make out a prima facie case, showing: (i) plaintiff belongs to a Title
VII-protected group; (ii) plaintiff applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) despite plaintiff’s qualifications, the employer rejected plaintiff; and (iv)
after the rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons of plaintiff’s qualifications. If plaintiff shows this, then, second, defendant has the
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The rules McDonnell Douglas and its progeny created do seem unhelpful, unnecessarily
complex, and arguably biased against plaintiffs. The criticism has ranged from a sophisticated
argument that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is too insubstantial to support a
presumption of discrimination in the first place165 to the highly quotable line that “the
McDonnell Douglas framework contributes about as much to the proper outcome of a
discrimination case as the Star Spangled Banner contributes to the proper outcome of a baseball
game.”166
The problems of McDonnell Douglas were magnified, or perhaps revealed, by St. Mary’s
Honor Center v. Hicks.167 In Hicks, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff in a Title VII case
could still lose on summary judgment even though he made out a prima facie case and proved
that the employer’s proffered “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” was pretext, i.e., not the
real reason for the employer’s act.168 The fact-finder could find that the employer acted out of a
non-discriminatory motive other than the reason the employer articulated. Shocking many
commentators, Hicks held that fact finders could find a reason to be the “real” motivation for a
challenged act even though the employer in Hicks not only failed to articulate this reason, but
burden of production to articulate a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for the employment
action being challenged as discriminatory. Then, third, plaintiff has the burden of persuasion to
show that defendant’s reason was pretext. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 441 U.S. 792 (1973).
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also denied the reason was even true.169 The Court stressed that the burden of persuasion always
remained with plaintiff, concluding that, “Title VII does not award damages against employers
who cannot prove a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action.”170
This decision prompted a hailstorm of academic criticism,171 and a few authors did
discuss the difficulty of reconciling at-will and Title VII rules.172 But the more common
response was that Hicks should be reversed, or that the entire the McDonnell Douglas process
should be abandoned or substantially revised.173
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Discrimination, Plain and Simple, 36 TULSA L.J. 557, 573 (2001) (proving the employer’s
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Lower courts initially made the effects of Hicks even worse. After Hicks, some Federal
Circuits required “pretext plus” — meaning that to avoid losing on summary judgment,
plaintiffs always had to show more than just a prima facie case and that the defendant’s proffered
reason was pretext.174 The Supreme Court then held in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products
that a prima facie case and proof of pretext “may permit” a finding of discrimination.175 But
plaintiffs can still lose on summary judgment even after proving both prima facie case and
pretext. Reeves reined in an extreme anti-plaintiff reading of Hicks, but the problem Hicks
exemplifies still exists.
This problem would not exist if the rule that swallows the exception were removed.
McGinley explains how Hicks itself would have come out under a just cause regime. The
employer would have had the burden to show a valid reason. It would have articulated its
defense that plaintiff was fired because he violated certain rules (the non-discriminatory reason
articulated in Hicks). But, when plaintiff showed that reason to be false, under a just cause
regime, plaintiff would have won. This seems like the more just result: it seems fair that a party
loses if it lies in litigation about its act that harmed another party; and, as McGinley notes, the
employer has access to the information concerning plaintiff’s discharge.176 Further, we can see
in another area of law that, where the issue is an actor’s motivation, it is fairer and more
reasonable to put the burden on the actor to prove what his state of mind was, rather than to
require another party, with much less information about the actor, to try to do the same.
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B. Lessons From Batson and the Law of Preemptive Juror Strikes
The problem that at-will rules create in Title VII law is highlighted by an analogous area
of law: peremptory challenges to prospective jurors made on the basis of race. Such challenges
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,177 but, similar to at-will rules,
peremptory challenges made for any of a whole host of other reasons, including poor or silly
ones, are legal.178 Experience with peremptory challenges shows that a regime that permits
actions based on any motivation except a specified few is difficult to administer. Here too,
discrimination law is crippled by a laissez-faire ground norm. Some recent proposals to amend
rules for peremptory challenges acknowledge that the problem is this background analog of the
at-will rule, and that, therefore, challenges should be permitted only for cause. Employment
discrimination scholars should pay more heed to this area of law.
1. Batson and McDonnell Douglas
In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court set out a method of proof for cases claiming
discrimination in peremptory challenges, a structure identical to the McDonnell Douglas line of
Title VII cases.179 First, the criminal defendant must make a prima facie showing that the
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178

Quin Sorenson, Backdooring Batson: The Improper Use of Racial Memory and Other
‘Peculiar’ Characteristics in Juror Challenges, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 71 (2003);
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prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors because of their race; the facts
must create an inference of discriminatory purpose. Second, if such a showing is made, the
burden shifts to the State to offer a non-discriminatory reason for the exclusion.180 Analogous to
McDonnell Douglas, “even if the State produces only a frivolous or utterly nonsensical
justification for its strike, the case does not end – it merely proceeds to step three.”181 Third, the
criminal defendant has the opportunity to try to show that the State’s explanation was merely
“pretext.” And even if defendant does so, the trial court must decide whether defendant
established “purposeful discrimination.”182 As with McDonnell Douglas, the burden of
persuasion always rests with the party asserting discrimination.183
Notably, the underlying “rule” in Batson cases is precisely analogous to the underlying
rule of employment at-will in Title VII cases. Employment discrimination law must co-exist
with an overarching legal rule permitting the employer to discharge for almost any reason.
Batson’s Constitutional protections must co-exist with a similar overarching rule, what Samuel
Gross calls, “the unreviewable discretion that was understood to be the essence of the right to
exercise peremptory challenges.”184
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(per curiam).
182

Id.; Batson, at 96-97; Sorenson, Backdooring Batson, at 78-79.

183

Johnson v. California, 125 S.Ct. at 2417; Sorenson, Backdooring Batson, 94.

184

Gross, Race, Peremptories, and Capital Jury Deliberations, at 290.
45

2. Batson: an Exception Swallowed by a Similar Rule
This general rule of party discretion in peremptory challenges has largely swallowed the
Batson exception, just as employment at-will has swallowed anti-discrimination law. Batson has
“engendered an enormous amount of often virulent criticism,”185 Antony Page notes, adding that
the Batson “framework is woefully ill-suited” to address race discrimination.186 Daniel Hinkle
concludes that “most commentators and practicing lawyers” believe that Batson is “ineffective”
even at stopping challenges based only and unambiguously on race.187 David Cole agrees that
Batson is “generally ineffective at stopping even blatant racists.”188 Samuel Gross provides
evidence that “Batson is not much of a check” on race discrimination in peremptory
challenges.189 Lonnie Brown, Jr., argues that Batson’s burden shifting process actually makes
judges more willing to accept the state’s race-neutral explanations, “no matter how suspect.”190
Similarly, Quin Sorenson complains when the state offers its nondiscriminatory reason for the
challenge, “courts defer to any explanation, regardless of how unreasonable or implausible.”191
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Recently, in Miller-El v. Dretke, the Supreme Court acknowledged that in Batson cases,
“the rub has been the practical difficulty of ferreting out discrimination in selections discretionary
by nature, and choices subject to myriad legitimate influences.”192 This actually understates the
problem, because to defeat a Batson claim, it is not necessary to show that a motivation for a
strike is in any substantive or normative sense “legitimate.” The claim loses if the fact-finder
believes that the motivation for the strike was motivated by any reason besides prohibited
discrimination, even a frivolous or nonsensical reason.
In a concurring opinion in Miller-El, Justice Breyer detailed the “practical problems of
proof” in Batson cases, and – most significantly here – he arguably endorsed a suggestion that the
problem could only be solved by requiring that all strikes be done “for cause.” That thesis is
exactly analogous to the argument herein that Title VII rights are fatally undermined by the
absence of just cause discharge rules.
Indeed, Justice Breyer’s concerns could have been taken from any of a number of
critiques of employment discrimination law, if the word “employer” was substituted for
“prosecutor.”193 Most significantly here, he noted that Batson asks fact finders to “engage in the
awkward, sometimes hopeless, task of second-guessing a prosecutor’s instinctive judgment – the
underlying basis for which may be invisible even to the prosecutor exercising the challenge.”194
As with Title VII law, this problem would not exist if the actor accused of racial discrimination
were required to prove a legitimate, defensible reason for the act.
192
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Breyer explored the weakness of Batson rules, citing at length studies and articles
“suggesting that, despite Batson, the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges remains a
problem.”195 The “use of race- and gender-based stereotypes in the jury selection process seems
better organized and more systematized than ever before.”196 The case at bar illustrated the
inability of the rule to accomplish its goal: defendant Miller-El had “marshaled extensive
evidence of racial bias,” yet his “challenge has resulted in 17 years of largely unsuccessful and
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Superior Court); Kevin Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and
Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L.REV. 447, 462- 464 (1996) (Batson challenge
success rates are lower where peremptories were used to strike black, rather than white, potential
jurors); Jeffrey Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection and Jury Selection: Denying That
Race Still Matters, 1994 WIS. L.REV. 511, 583-589 (few Batson challenges succeed); Note,
Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Is the Peremptory Challenge Still
Preeminent?, 36 B.C. L. REV. 161, 189, and n. 303 (1994) (same); Jean Montoya, The Future of
the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by Questionnaire and the "Blind" Peremptory
Challenge, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 981, 1006, nn. 126-127, 1035 (1996) (attorneys’ views on
the difficulty of proving Batson claims).
196

125 S.Ct. at 2342 (Breyer concurring), citing Leonard Post, A Loaded Box of Stereotypes:
Despite ‘Batson,’ Race, Gender Play Big Roles in Jury Selection, NAT. L.J. (Apr. 25, 2005), at 1,
18.
48

protracted litigation – including 8 different judicial proceedings . . . involving 23 judges, of
whom 6 found the Batson standard violated and 16 to the contrary.”197
Most significantly here, Justice Breyer ultimately suggested that the solution to this
problem would be to require an articulated and truly legitimate “cause” for striking jurors. He
wrote that “a jury system without peremptories is no longer unthinkable,”198 and quoted
approvingly from an article written by Justice Stevens that argued, “citizens should not be denied
the opportunity to serve as jurors unless an impartial judge states a reason for the denial, as with
a strike for cause.”199 For all these reasons as well, employment should not be terminated except
for cause. Otherwise, the rule swallows the exception.
C. Removing the Rule Would Strengthen the Exception
The state of Title VII law is so bad that Ann McGinley has called for just cause discharge
to replace, not merely supplement anti-discrimination law.200 But it is not necessary or desirable
to go this far. First, anti-discrimination law can work well in combination with just cause
protections (union members, for example, can bring discrimination claims under both federal law
and just cause contract provisions).201 Anti-discrimination laws can add extra damages (punitive
197
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and emotional distress damages are available in disparate treatment cases but not under most
general just cause regimes). This underscores, for example, that combating racism in
employment is an especially important goal and that racist acts can often cause more psychic
harm than a discharge for trivial reasons. Such acts are a reminder that some members of society
have long been and still are vulnerable to harms in many significant aspects of their lives simply
because of being born into a certain group. It is also worth underscoring by statute that certain
types of “reasons” are not “just cause.” Finally, it would also be odd to have discharge entirely
carved out of anti-discrimination law, while anti-discrimination law would still be necessary to
cover a wide range of other employment-related acts (hiring, discipline, harassment, etc.).202
Also, a just cause rule would likely reduce the number of weak discrimination claims.
Given that the majority of American workers are at-will employees, if they are fired, in their
minds unjustly, what advice is a lawyer likely to give them about their legal options? The current
regime makes it more probable that workers will, as Cynthia Estlund puts it, “see and claim
discrimination when there is simply garden variety unfairness.”203 This is not to say that the
shockingly low success rates of Title VII plaintiffs are due significantly to weak claims. After
all, plaintiffs’ lawyers in employment discrimination cases are still business people, often
working on a contingency-fee basis.204 But a general just cause standard would redirect some
time- and resource-wasting Title VII cases into a more appropriate legal framework.
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IV. Balancing the Rule and the Exceptions: the Weight of the Rule
Assuming that the at-will rule necessarily and fundamentally interferes with the
successful enforcement of the NLRA and Title VII, what should be done? First, as argued above,
we should understand this effect when analyzing or proposing changes to Title VII and the
NLRA. Second, we should take this effect into account when debating the future of the at-will
rule. In this regard, if a rule vitiates exceptions, the next step should be to weigh the value of the
rule versus the value of the exceptions.
At-will doctrine is often seen as crucial in U.S. employment law. But there is a strong
argument for jettisoning a rule that swallows exceptions where, as here: (a) the rule has become
so riddled with other exceptions so small yet vague as to make the rule less workable on its own
terms for employers as well as employees; (b) the rule has already been rejected by large parts of
the economy, by one state, and by most other comparable nations, with no obvious disastrous
effects; and (c) the exceptions the rule is swallowing express vitally important societal interests.
A. The Surprisingly Contentious Early History of Employment At-Will
On one hand, at-will employment law seems to be a permanent fixture in U.S. law:
deeply rooted and stubbornly persisting while other nations abandon it.205 At-will has been the
default rule in the U.S. for over a century, with no serious attempt to abandon the entire rule on a
national basis. Yet employment at-will was not a fixture of American life from the start: it did
not emerge as the general rule until a century of U.S. history had passed. Further, there were
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challenges to it almost from the beginning, through statutes creating, or attempting to create,
significant exceptions.
Employment at-will emerged in the U.S. in the late nineteenth century. At least through
the Civil War, the U.S. used variants of English master-servant law: hiring generally was
presumed to be for a year and terminable on three months notice. Penalties for workers who quit
early could be significant: jail in early times; later, forfeiture of all pay, including that for work
completed. But the old rule did seem to promise that employees could not be discharged without
cause during the presumed term.206 In 1877, Horace Wood published a treatise asserting that
employment “at-will” was the “American rule.” Despite significant evidence that this was not, in
fact, the doctrine American courts had been using,207 courts in a significant number of states
quickly embraced it.208
Almost immediately, legislatures tried to create exceptions to the at-will rule. In the late
nineteenth century, unions, progressives, and their allies helped pass hundreds of laws regulating
the workplace, scores limiting the at-will rule. Courts held many such laws unconstitutional in
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what is generically known as the “Lochner” era.209 William Forbath estimates that sixty such
laws were invalidated by 1900,210 and further that from the 1880s to 1922, roughly 300 separate
laws regulating labor and employment were held unconstitutional.211 Two Supreme Court cases
held that laws prohibiting employers from discharging employees because of their union
membership were unconstitutional. But these were only part of a broad wave of laws attempting
to limit at-will rules in this and other ways.212
Although they did not survive judicial scrutiny, the fact that these laws were enacted is
evidence of widespread popular and legislative support for some exceptions to the at-will rule
quite soon after it was adopted. In the 1890s, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Missouri all
enacted statutes making union membership an illegal grounds for discharge. The Illinois
Supreme Court struck its state law down in 1900, and other state courts did likewise.213
Attempts to carve out exceptions to at-will rules by providing various protections at work
continued. In the late nineteenth century, many states passed laws limiting hours of work (under
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such laws, employers could not discharge employees for refusing to work over the limit).214 In
the first two decades of the twentieth century, courts invalidated hours laws in California, Alaska,
Oregon, Massachusetts, Utah, Louisiana, Washington, Missouri, and Wisconsin.215 Again, these
laws demonstrated a popular sentiment that employment should not be entirely at-will.
Soon thereafter, laws that prohibited discharge on various grounds became wellestablished. The Railway Labor Act of 1926 prohibited covered employers (mostly railroads)
from discharging employees because of union affiliation.216 The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932
generally made “yellow dog” contracts (agreements requiring that employees not be union
members, on pain of discharge) unenforceable.217 A few years later, the NLRA made it illegal to
discharge employees for supporting a union. Also, during the New Deal, the Fair Labor
Standards Act, generally governing wages and hours, included a provision that would be
common among later employment laws: an anti-retaliation section barring covered employers
from firing employees because of the employee’s attempts to enforce rights under the law.218
Of course, these laws did not intend to eliminate the general rule of employment at-will.
But from the very inception of employment-at-will, legislatures all across the country repeatedly
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enacted exceptions to it. This reflects a long-standing, widespread unease with employment atwill in its full, undiluted form.
B. The Decreased Utility of the Modern Rule
Ironically, despite its debilitating effect on the NLRA and Title VII, the employment atwill rule today is weakened and unclear. It is increasingly subject to common law exceptions that
are numerous, vague, and yet very narrow.219 This simultaneously makes employment less
reliably within the sole discretion of the employer while providing employees with few
predictable or even easily understood rights. This makes the rule less valuable to both sides.
One set of exceptions comes from common law tort and contract doctrines. Since the
1970s, forty to forty-five states have adopted some such modifications to the at-will rule. From
the late 1970s to the late 1980s, the number of states incorporating the tort of wrongful discharge
more than tripled and judicial adoption of the implied contract exception (employment contracts
based, for example, on employee handbooks) quadrupled from fewer than ten states to nearly
forty.220 By the early 1990s, employees were filing approximately 10,000 wrongful discharge
suits annually in state courts.221
While numerous, these exceptions are narrow and unpredictable, disadvantaging
employers and employees. The most common exception, the tort of wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy,222 now covers, in various ways in different jurisdictions, discharges
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motivated by the employee’s exercise of a work-related right (e.g., filing a workers’
compensation claim), refusal to violate laws at work (e.g., health and safety rules), reporting
illegal activity by the company (whistle-blowing), or protecting public safety.223 Courts are
“wildly inconsistent” in what is protected,224 making distinctions that would, at minimum, be
difficult for a non-expert party to predict in advance. For example, in cases involving discharge
for revealing an employer’s illegal acts, some courts protect employees who report the act to a
public agency, but not employees who report the act internally within the company.225
Courts now find implied contracts based on language in employee handbooks, employer
rules, and in oral statements. Courts have also used promissory estoppel rules in cases involving
oral statements and patterns of behavior. A few courts have even found an obligation of good
faith and fair dealing in at-will” employment contracts,226 albeit in especially unclear
decisions.227 But contract exceptions generally are often confusing.228
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Thus, many claim that the at-will rule is “riddled with so many exceptions that it cannot
be relied upon.”229 Again, one gets the gist from reading the titles of law review articles: “AtWill Employment: Going, Going . . .,” and “Employment-at-Will: The Impending Death of a
Doctrine,” for example.230 Also, a continuing stream of law review articles documents erosions
of at-will rules in particular states.231
Such fears are partly overblown,232 but perhaps the best description of the at-will rule
today is that it embodies the worst of both worlds, with exceptions so numerous and unclear as to
frustrate employers but too small and narrow to protect employees in the vast majority of
circumstances. Many of the states recognizing the public policy exception have defined public
policy very narrowly, such that only a “handful of employees” can use the tort of wrongful
discharge.233 The doctrine that employee manuals can become enforceable contracts is also
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“extremely limited” and can easily be avoided by explicit disclaimers in the handbook.234 The
few courts that have recognized the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing use it “very
conservatively.”235 Further, these common law theories vary dramatically from state to state.236
Different states use the same rationales to adopt and reject opposite sets of rules.237
Statutory exceptions to at-will further undercut the utility of the rule. At the federal level,
beyond Title VII and the NLRA, the Americans With Disabilities Act238 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act bar discharge for specific reasons.239 A host of other
employment laws bar “retaliation” (including discharge) against employees for attempting to
enforce their rights under those laws: for example, the FLSA, mentioned above; the Occupational
Health and Safety Act;240 and the Family and Medical Leave Act.241
Further, state statutes limiting grounds for discharge continue to proliferate. Most, if not
all, state workers’ compensation and unemployment compensation laws contain anti-retaliation
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rules.242 Seventeen states and many local governments bar discrimination, including discharge,
on the basis of sexual orientation.243 Some state laws go even further beyond federal law. In the
1990s, eight states enacted “lifestyle discrimination statutes,” which bar employers from
discriminating against employees for using “lawful products” or engaging in “lawful activities.”
Although few cases have been decided under such statutes thus far, they potentially cut a wide
swath out of employment at-will.244
C. Practical and Moral Considerations
Again, this system has become the worst of both worlds. Employers cannot feel secure
that they can fire at will, employees in most cases are not protected from arbitrary discharge, and
neither side is confident as to what the law is. Clyde Summers warned that such a system would
“hold out promises to the employee, harass and impoverish the employer, enrich the lawyers, and
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clog the legal machinery.”245 Matthew Finkin agrees that this system is “a lottery” primarily
benefitting lawyers on both sides.246 Finkin quotes a report arguing that the current system
has none of the economic benefits of wrongful discharge protective
law precisely because it eschews protecting employees from
wrongful discharge; but it does have all the high transaction costs
and uncertainties that have been singled out as negative aspects of
such systems.247
Further, it appears that neither employers nor employees really understand the rule. Employers
greatly overestimate their exposure to wrongful discharge liability,248 and may not understand
that at-will actually is the rule.249 At-will employees also often incorrectly think that they can
only be fired for cause, and a substantial majority of workers do not believe that at-will is the
current rule.250
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Also, most employees are not, in any practical sense, “bargaining” for such a rule. To
imagine realistically an applicant for a low level retail or factory job asking for a just cause
provision is to put to rest the question of “bargaining.” The obstacles to agreement would be
much greater than for, say, a request for greater compensation. First, who would write the “just
cause” agreement and who would interpret the terms? Few such applicants could even suggest
answers. Second, it would be a brave applicant indeed who would raise the prospect of her
prospective employer firing her for an unjust cause. Third, it is unlikely a manager would grant
this demand simply because it is so unusual. Managers are used to dealing with some variations
in pay, but (outside the unionized and public sectors) are not used to just cause provisions, and
they would predictably be unenthusiastic about supervising a team of employees some of whom
were protected by just cause provisions and some of whom were not. Fourth, the fact that many
managers would consider it an odd request itself creates a disincentive to propose it. Suppose an
entry level law professor demanded that a law school buy a pet pony for his child in lieu of the
more normal moving expenses. This might actually be cheaper for the employer, but it would
undoubtedly be considered more than a bit strange – not the sort of reputation a starting
employee (even a skilled professional) would want.
This is why individually-bargained just cause agreements are actually quite rare, and
nearly non-existent outside the highest levels of employment.251 This does not indicate that
employees do not value “just cause” agreements, because in the unionized sector, where
bargaining power is more equal, just-cause provisions are practically universal.
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Moral objections to at-will rules can also be made. Such rules permit employers to treat
employees much like property in important respects.252 Estimates of the number of workers fired
annually without just cause range from 150,000 to 200,000, and these discharges have serious
effects on the finances and mental and physical health of the workers and families involved.
Many suffer severe emotional trauma.253 Finkin writes, “morally, the just employer does not
dismiss an employee without just cause.”254
In sum, the at-will rule has both practical and moral difficulties.255 Again, the point here
is to weigh the utility of the rule against the important exceptions that the rule undermines. As
Finkin concludes, “[o]nce exceptions start to be made, anomalies emerge. The greater the texture
of exceptions, the more anomalous it becomes to insist upon the at-will rule.”256
D. Proposed and Actual Eliminations of the At-Will Presumption
In weighing whether to dispose of a rule that swallows important exceptions, it is worth
looking at jurisdictions that have actually done so, to show that eliminating the rule is not as
radical or unthinkable as might be supposed. Employees in significant segments of the U.S.
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economy are currently not at-will. The state of Montana has already adopted a law replacing the
at-will presumption with a general just-cause rule – notably, at the behest of employers — as
have the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and nearly every other industrial democracy.257
1. The Public and Unionized Sectors
In the U.S. today, large sections of the economy function with just cause, not at-will rules.
All or nearly all private sector employees working under union contracts (which almost always
contain “just cause” discharge provisions) and most public employees (covered by civil service
rules, as described above).258 Despite a few enduring myths, there is no evidence that these rules
have caused any significant inefficiency in either sector.
First, many studies show that unionization can actually increase productivity and
efficiency. A World Bank report based on more than 1,000 studies on the effects of unions found
that countries with high unionization rates tend to have higher productivity and lower
unemployment. Freeman and Medoff’s What do Unions Do? concludes that unionized firms are
often more productive than non-union establishments. A recent survey of the literature found
“scant evidence” that unions reduce productivity and “substantial evidence” that they improve
productivity in many industries. Another survey similarly noted that most analyses have found
that unions improve firm performance.259 A few studies dissent in part from these finding.260
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But even this minority view is not a brief for at-will employment. On the other hand, at-will
rules may impede productivity.261
What of the objection that just-cause rules would raise unemployment rates because
employers would be less willing to hire employees that they could not fire? Even with just cause
protection, workers in the unionized or public sector can and routinely are fired. A study of
29,000 labor arbitrations found that employees were at least partially successful in 49 percent of
the cases, which means employers were entirely successful 51 percent of the time.262 And unions
certainly do not challenge all discharges in arbitrations. As to public employees for example, in
2001, nearly 9,000 federal employees were terminated for disciplinary reasons alone.263 Further
data below also suggests that just cause rules are not a major factor in employment rates.
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Also, simple compromises exist that allow employers to rid themselves easily of hires
who turn out to be obviously unsuited for the job, while still preserving just cause rights for the
bulk of employees, most obviously probationary periods before just-cause protections kick in.
This would be consistent with provisions in most civil service laws and many union contracts,264
as well as the law in many European nations.265
2. Montana’s Just Cause Statute
Three jurisdictions in the U.S. have already eliminated the at-will rule entirely: Montana,
the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico.266 This section will briefly discuss Montana’s experience.
Three points are notable. First, the value of the rule is being questioned. Second, Montana’s rule
was passed largely at the behest of employers. Third, no disasters ensued after the rule was
eliminated. Notably, the unemployment rate in Montana declined from 7.4 percent in 1987 when
the Montana Act was passed to 5.5 percent in 1995.267
Montana’s Act provides in part that a discharge is wrongful if it was not for good cause
and the employee had completed a probationary period of employment.268 Employers lobbied for
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this bill because they felt the at-will system was too unpredictable and awards were too high in
wrongful discharge cases.269 Thus, the Act preempts all common law causes of action for
discharge arising from tort, express contract, or implied contract.270 A prevailing plaintiff may
receive lost wages and benefits for up to four years from the date of discharge.271 Punitive
damages are available only if the employee can show by clear and convincing evidence that the
employer engaged in actual fraud or malice.272 There is no fee-shifting provision in favor of
plaintiffs, and plaintiffs have the burden of proving a lack of good cause.273
Although this is a fairly weak “just cause” statute,274 it does eliminate the at-will
presumption. It suggests that the “American rule” of at-will might be altered in other U.S.
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jurisdictions, in part because employers might back a just cause rule to avoid litigation under
other legal theories.
3. Just Cause in Other Countries
The at-will rule is almost unique to the U.S., among industrialized democracies.
Approximately sixty such countries have some form of just cause protection; only the U.S.,
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Israel, and South Africa do not.275 The other major industrialized
nations have ratified the Termination of Employment Convention of the International Labor
Organization (ILO), which requires just cause for termination.276 Article 4 of the Convention
states that employment shall not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for such termination
connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the operational requirements of
the undertaking.” Workers have the rights to try to rebut the charges against them before
termination and to appeal to an impartial body. The burden of proof is on the employer.277
There are variations in practice as to, for example, the burden of proof, what body hears
the case, and remedies.278 The German statute provides that dismissals that are “socially
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unjustified” are void. Swedish law requires that dismissals must be based on “objective cause.”
Japanese law requires that dismissals must have an “objectively and socially reasonable
cause.”279 British law requires that the discharge be “fair,” and gives (non-exclusive) lists of fair
and unfair reasons.280 Italy requires a “justified reason”; others use similar rules.281 A number of
countries allow summary dismissal for especially bad behavior.282
Again, a common critique of just-cause rules is that they can raise unemployment levels:
employers may be less willing to hire if they believe it is more difficult to fire employees they do
not want to retain. On the other hand, just cause rules may promote stable employment
relationships, conducive to investment in human capital and cooperation.283 The empirical
evidence from Europe, in short, is mixed. A 1999 study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development found no evidence that overall employment levels were affected by
regulation of termination; but an ILO report found some evidence that “excessive regulation may
deter employers from hiring workers for fear of difficulty in getting rid of them.”284 Also, while
some argue that U.S. labor and employment laws are responsible for unemployment rates,
currently lower in the U.S. than in Europe and Japan, it is worth noting that in the last few
279
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decades, there have been significant periods in which a number of European countries and Japan
have had lower unemployment than the U.S. did. It is hard to attribute these shifts in
employment rates to the unchanging just cause rule, as opposed to other factors.285
This debate was highlighted recently when French students and others protested over
proposals to remove just cause protections from young workers in their first two years of
employment. Proponents of the proposal often cited high levels of unemployment among French
youth as the main reason for the proposed change. As Will Pfaff has explained, the cited rate
was deceptive. Free baccalaureate- and university-level education keeps young people in France
out of the job market for much longer than young people in comparable countries. In reality,
only 7.8 percent of French people under 25 are actually out of work (as compared to 7.4 percent
in Britain and 6.5% in Germany). Comparison to U.S. figures is “practically impossible,” since
U.S. unemployment numbers exclude the imprisoned and those not actively seeking work.286
Also, while France and Germany have in recent years experienced higher rates of
unemployment than has the U.S., this arguably not because of the lack of an at-will rule, but
rather because a broader web of labor and employment laws add restrictions well beyond just
cause discharge requirements. For example, laws in those countries require either administrative
approval of or notice and consultation with employee organizations before layoffs or collective
dismissals. Laws restricting disciplinary discharges do not have the negative effects of laws that
also restrict mass layoffs.287 Generally, French employment law is “much more inflexible” than
285
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other countries that use just cause rules and have relatively low unemployment, for example,
Scandinavian nations.288
That most of the rest of the world has rejected at-will employment is not a dispositive
reason for the U.S. to reject it. But it does underscore the fact that the rule is not necessary for
productive businesses or a modern economy.
4. The Model Uniform Employment Termination Act
Even in the U.S., discussions continue about eliminating the default at-will rule for the
non-union, private sector. The Model Uniform Employment-Termination Act (META), drafted
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws would bar discharge
without “good cause”289 for employees with a minimum term of service.290 The META would
pre-empt discharge claims based on public policy or contract, but not claims arising under state
or federal statutes, collective bargaining agreements, or express contracts.291
The META has been critiqued for being weak, a “toothless tiger.” Not only does it
provide no tort, contract, or punitive damages, it also allows employers and employee to agree as
to what constitutes good cause or even waive the good cause requirement under certain
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circumstances.292 Also, unlike most just cause rules, the META puts the burden on the employee
to prove that the employer lacked good cause.293
The META has not yet been adopted in any states,294 and opposition to it remains
significant.295 Still, it shows that at least parts of the mainstream legal reform movement in the
U.S. are comfortable with jettisoning the at-will rule.
V. Balancing the Rule and the Exceptions: the Weight of the Exceptions
What of the exceptions the at-will rule is swallowing? Title VII and the NLRA
unquestionably express well-established, generally accepted, vitally important values in this
society, rights considered core human rights in all advanced democratic nations. This
proposition is not seriously disputed, so this section will only briefly summarize the points.
The right of workers to act collectively is firmly rooted in basic concepts of civil
liberties.296 Labor rights are human rights. Article 23(4) of the United Nation’s Universal

292

Parties may waive just cause protection if the employer agrees to provide the employee
with a month’s severance pay if the discharge was for any reason other than willful misconduct.
Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger, at 889, 896, 898, 901 (the META is Sprang’s “toothless
tiger”); McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will, at 1506-07, citing META §§
3, 4(c), 5, and 6; Parker, At-Will Employment and the Common Law, 377, 379.
293

McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will, at 1507, citing META § 6(e).

294

Bird, Rethinking Wrongful Discharge, at 524; Parker, At-Will Employment and the
Common Law, at 378.
295

The American Law Institute is working on a Restatement of Employment Law which
Matthew Finkin has criticized partly because the “whole thrust of this draft is to shore up the atwill rule.” Finkin, Second Thoughts on a Restatement of Employment Law, at 280-83, 300 (quote
on 300). Robert Bird argues that adopting just cause as the default rule would require an
“immense” change in the law, and that “chances are remote” that this will happen. Bird,
Rethinking Wrongful Discharge, 523. For similar skepticism, see Parker, At-Will Employment
and the Common Law.
71

Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 includes the right to form unions. Article 22 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the United States ratified in 1992,
incorporates language from the Universal Declaration: “Everyone shall have the right . . . to
form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.” Article 8 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also affirms the “right of everyone to form
trade unions and join the trade union of his choice.”297
The NLRA was passed to solve one of the most serious continuing problems in American
social and economic history: the willingness of workers to organize into unions and take
collective action even when they generally had no legal right to do so; and the strong, violent,
and often deadly opposition they faced.298 The NLRA’s Findings and Declaration of Policy
states that the right “to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury,” and
declared it to be national policy to avoid such injuries by “encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining” and protecting the right to organize unions.299 The NLRA
“established the most democratic procedure in U.S. labor history for the participation of workers
296
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in the determination of their wages, hours, and working conditions,”300 James Gross writes.
Ellen Dannin adds that the NLRA’s values were “intended to, and still can, transform our
workplaces and our society.”301
Concrete demonstrations of the profound importance of these values can be found in the
tens of millions of workers who have joined unions in the past century, despite opposition that
killed thousands and injured many more.302 The desire for an effective voice in the conditions of
one’s work – where many people spend at least half their waking hours – is deeply held and
widespread. The NLRA still holds out the most promise for providing such a voice to a huge
segment of the American economy.
Title VII arose out of the equally strong and determined civil rights movement. It was
also the product of social turmoil that saw its advocates beaten and killed.303 Title VII was
passed to address systemic, pervasive problems of discrimination throughout the American
economy, discrimination that excluded most or all blacks and most or all women from entire job
categories and professions.304 The need for an effective Title VII continues today. As Nancy
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Dowd notes, while “opportunities for women and minorities have improved, persisting, dramatic
sex and race segregation, both between and within occupations” remains, “with great significance
for the families of those workers.” Thus, the intervention of the state to insure some employment
opportunity and commitment to these values, is critical.”305
There is practically no opposition to the basic idea that the types of workers the NLRA
covers should have the right to organize and bargain collectively,306 and practically no opposition
to the promise in Title VII that at least most employers should not be allowed to discriminate on
the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin.307 Instead, these laws express widely-shared,
deeply held values.
VI. Conclusion
In debates about laws regulating the workplace in the U.S., it is necessary to understand
the extent to which the at-will rule undermines the NLRA and Title VII and to balance the value
of continuing the rule against the harm the rule does by crippling its exceptions. Here, the at-will
rule was never fully embraced in the U.S., and today is so riddled with so many small vague
exceptions as to thoroughly frustrate advocates for both employers and employees. The rule has
been eliminated in segments of the U.S. economy and elsewhere with no disastrous effects. On
the other hand, the exceptions embodied in labor and anti-discrimination law are universally and
correctly understood as vitally important.
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While the effects of at-will doctrine must be considered in debates over the future of this
rule, the NLRA, and Title VII, eliminating employment at-will, of course, would not solve all the
problems in NLRA or Title VII law. In the area of discrimination, for example, it would not
affect most sexual harassment cases. But discharge rules are important. The bulk of Title VII
claims now involve firing.308 In labor law, unions would still face international competition and
less than favorable interpretations of the NLRA. Still, removing the common impediment, the
rule that swallows both exceptions, would be the single most important step that could be taken
to vindicate rights that nearly all Americans believe workers in this country should have.
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